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INTRODUCTION
A quarter of a century after its publication, Democracy and Distrust'
remains the single most perceptive justificatory account of the work of the
Warren Court and arguably of modern constitutional law more broadly. Yet
the continuing influence of John Hart Ely's process theory of American
constitutional law may seem surprising, given that the account has been
incisively criticized as both too limited and too sweeping. Beginning with
Laurence Tribe's The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories and culminating in the work of Ronald Dworkin and others, critics
have argued that the representation-reinforcing approach to interpreting the
Constitution is no less laden with controversial value judgments than other,
more openly substantive methods and, therefore, that judicial review ought
not be restricted in the way Ely thought it should be. From the other side,
those whom Ely called "interpretivists" have invoked the same set of
arguments as a basis for concluding that the Constitution's open-ended
provisions should be given neither substantive nor procedural content apart
from what is narrowly entailed by the original understanding of its Framers
and ratifiers.
In light of these mirroring critiques, what accounts for the staying
power of Democracy and Distrust? The answer, to which Ely himself
points in the opening pages of the book, is the popularity of representative
democracy. 4 "We have as a society from the beginning," he writes, "and
now almost instinctively, accepted the notion that a representative
democracy must be our form of government.",5 By making representative
democracy the centerpiece of his account of judicial review, Ely trades on
this deeply rooted instinct. Throughout Democracy and Distrust, he invokes
1. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
2. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 76-8i (1996) (arguing that the distinction between enumerated and unenumerated
rights, which is central to Ely's theory, is incoherent); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-72 (1980).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 143-60 (1990).
4. Following Ely himself, in these pages I use terms such as "democracy," "representative
democracy," and "democratic participation" somewhat interchangeably. I recognize that these and
other terms such as "majority rule" may convey important differences in meaning in various
contexts and that Ely may be legitimately criticized for underspecifying exactly what form of
government he had in mind when he used them. Because I am less interested in applying Ely's
method than in understanding the overall nature of his project, these differences are largely
irrelevant to my purposes here.
5. ELY, supra note 1, at 5.
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"the basic democratic theory of our government" 6 as the standard against
which an approach to judicial review should be measured.
Although Ely ultimately attaches weight to the value of representative
democracy because of its longstanding and continuing acceptance by the
people, the core of his affirmative argument-which appears in chapter
four-purports to derive that value principally from the constitutional text
and structure. In barely fourteen pages he establishes that most of the
Constitution consists of structural provisions about offices, elections, and so
forth, going on to explain that even some of the relatively few provisions
setting forth individual rights might also best be understood as structural or
procedural.7 Having apparently derived the democratic criterion from the
Constitution's text and structure, Ely devotes the balance of Democracy
and Distrust to explaining how that principle can be used to guide judicial
interpretation of open-ended provisions like the Ninth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities
Clauses.8
In getting the project off the ground, however, the text and structure do
not bear the weight that Ely appears to place on them in chapter four. Given
the Constitution's manifest interest in fracturing the authority of any actor
or institution to speak on behalf of the people as a whole, one might at least
as readily infer the opposite master principle of limited government, a
principle that is also furthered by the document's substantive rights
provisions. If representative democracy were really the guiding principle
that Ely claims, there would seem to be little need for a written constitution
at all, except perhaps to specify, as in pre-Human Rights Act Great Britain
under the classical Diceyan conception, that the national legislature is
sovereign. 9
In any event, no master principle-not representative democracy,
limited government, individual liberty, equality, free enterprise, or any
other principle-can plausibly be made to stand for the whole of the
Constitution. It is the purpose of the document to frame a government that
serves multiple, often conflicting aims.
6. Id. at 45.
7. See id. at 88-101. Ely nonetheless acknowledges that it "would be ridiculous" to assert that
the Constitution is devoted entirely to matters of process and structure. Id. at 92.
8. See id. at 101-83.
9. And of course, Great Britain seemed to get along fine without even that sort of
ultraminimalist written constitution. I say "seemed" because one can question whether Great
Britain ever truly had a system of parliamentary (as opposed to popular) sovereignty. See Rivka
Weill, Dicey Was Not Diceyan, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 474 (2003). One can also question whether
Dicey himself believed in the simpler account. See id. at 492-93.
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If Democracy and Distrust thus sets forth an implausible positive
account of the Constitution, it nonetheless seems to provide an attractive
normative account of judicial review. The central principle of the
Constitution is not democracy, but the central problem facing life-tenured
judges charged with enforcing open-ended language like that found in the
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is one of reconciling their job
with democracy. That is not because the very concept of democracy
requires that all important decisions be made entirely by politically
accountable bodies. It is because in the absence of some set of limiting
principles to govern interpretation of the Constitution's open-ended
provisions, there would be nothing to stop courts from entirely supplanting
politically accountable bodies. Such a state of affairs would be inconsistent
with a Constitution that makes representative democracy a very important
principle.
The normative argument I have just sketched on Ely's behalf is
nonetheless still partly positive. If a constitution manifested no concern
with self-government-if, for example, it set forth judicially enforceable
limits on government power without empowering the people, as in, say, a
system of limited benign dictatorship--then a theory of representation
reinforcement would have little purchase as an account of how the judiciary
ought to enforce that constitution. So the fact that the actual Constitution
embraces a considerable measure of popular rule does indeed play a
substantial role in the argument for representation-reinforcing, and only
representation-reinforcing, judicial review of open-ended provisions.
But, to repeat, the argument ultimately succeeds because of the
widespread normative appeal of democracy. As Ely explains in the book's
opening passages, in the modem world we almost reflexively value self-
government. Thus, for constitutional lawyers, the Court has a
countermajoritarian difficulty; Congress does not have a
"counterindividual" difficulty. If we took limited government as our
starting point, we might well see matters differently. Yet democracy comes
first. To be sure, we as a people greatly value limits on government power
as well as representative democracy, but, to use Madison's phrase, judicial
delineation and enforcement of these limits is at best "auxiliary" to
government's "dependence on the people."10 So democracy turns out to be
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). I say "at
best" because when Madison wrote these words he was still committed to the view that, given the
strategy of enumerated powers, the Constitution did not need to include a Bill of Rights. The
"auxiliary" precautions to which he referred in Federalist No. 51 were the structural mechanisms
limiting democracy that comprised the original Constitution. In the course of the ratification
debate, however, Madison came to see how individual rights could serve the same purpose. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1991).
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important both for its own sake-so that the people can carry out their
projects-and for limiting government's potential excesses.
That is the largely unspoken piece of Ely's argument: that
representative democracy is good. Stated that way, the point sounds banal,
and it is. But is it even true? Is democracy good? Democracy and Distrust
argues that representative democracy is not-or at least is not inevitably-
self-sustaining; it may need the aid of an unelected judiciary armed with a
broadly worded constitution. The book takes for granted the more basic
point that democracy is worth sustaining.
I am not suggesting that Democracy and Distrust is a flawed work for
its failure to make an argument for the value of democracy. Ely was
perfectly justified in assuming that his audience would see its value. But the
value of democracy-as opposed to monarchy, autocracy, theocracy, and
other systems of government-is not universally acknowledged." More
importantly, even among those who value it, there are substantial
differences about how and how much to value the popular will. Other than
the fact that most of his audience would share his view, what justified
Ely-and Alexander Bickel and others-in casting democratic participation
as central to our constitutional system, such that the framing of Democracy
and Distrust as a response to a countermajoritarian difficulty seemed and
still seems perfectly natural?
This article suggests a tentative answer by forging a link between Ely's
work and that of coherentists like Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls. Critics
of Rawls's A Theory of Justice12 argued that, where Rawls purported to
derive universal principles of political justice, he in fact simply affirmed
principles of liberal democracy common to the twentieth-century West. 13 In
his successor volume, Political Liberalism, Rawls acknowledged the
socially and historically contingent character of his political principles but
11. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE-MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 262 (2003) (citing an infamous champion of
so-called Asian values for the proposition that one man, one vote is merely one of many possible
forms of government that meet human needs).
12. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
13. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed.
1984) (questioning the possibility of rational argument absent agreement on a conception of the
good); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 28-47 (2d ed. 1998)
(disagreeing with the picture of human identity that Rawls's theory purportedly assumes-a
human identity artificially isolated from community influences and obligations); MICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 79 (1983) (rejecting,
as unhelpful in the real world, the Rawlsian effort to root political justice in a very small number
of abstract principles). For the feminist version of the argument, see, for example, SEYLA
BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 2-3 (1992) (critiquing Rawls along with Enlightenment reasoning more
generally); and Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699,
1713 (1990) (associating the values advanced by Rawls with masculinity).
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denied that this contingency rendered these principles any less principles of
justice,1
4
Ely could have made a parallel maneuver. He might have argued that,
although representation reinforcement is not simply entailed by the
Constitution as a matter of text and structure, it is nonetheless the best
account of our collective understanding of the function of judicial review in
a constitutional democracy. Indeed, there are many passages in Democracy
and Distrust that suggest that Ely understood his account of American
judicial review as contingent in just the same way that Rawls came to
acknowledge that his account of liberal democracy was. This article pulls
together these "contingentist" strands to fashion-and then critique-a
prolegomenon to a work that would be to Democracy and Distrust what
Political Liberalism is to A Theory ofJustice.
Part I describes how, under the conventional reading, Democracy and
Distrust trades on the reader's sympathy for democracy. It concludes that
someone who does not come to the book with that sympathy will not find
enough in the Constitution itself for Ely's argument to be successful.
Part II sets forth a coherentist version of Ely's argument along the same
lines as, albeit with content that differs from, the sort of account of
constitutional practice given by Dworkin. By "coherentism" I mean simply
a method of understanding a practice, such as constitutional law, that aims
to make the best sense of that practice as a whole. 15 In arguing that Ely's
theory is best read as coherentist, I make no claim to novelty; I have little
doubt that Ely himself would have readily accepted that his account was
intended to be coherentist. 16 My claim is simply that recognizing the
coherentist character of Ely's argument enables us to see how widespread
public acceptance of democratic principles can count in favor of those
democratic principles in a noncircular fashion. However, calling attention
to the coherentist character of Ely's argument also calls attention to some
14. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xx (paperback ed. 1996) (rejecting "the so-
called Enlightenment project of finding a philosophical secular doctrine, one founded on reason
and yet comprehensive," in favor of "work[ing] out a conception of political justice for a
constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of reasonable doctrines [held by its diverse
citizens] might endorse").
15. Dworkin typically refers to his own approach as "interpretive" rather than coherentist, see
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 46-49, 68-73 (1986), but I use a different terminology here to
avoid confusion with Ely's use of the term "interpretivism" to mean something like "textualism"
or "originalism," see ELY, supra note 1, at 1. For simplicity, I also use "coherentist" to refer to
what Rawls and others call "constructivist" claims. For a discussion of the similarities and
differences between reflective equilibrium in the constructivism of Rawls and the principle of
integrity in Dworkin's version of interpretation, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the
Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REv. 211, 227 (1993) (fitting Ely into this pattern).
16. See Commentary, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 525, 527-28 (1981) (remarks of John Hart Ely)
(describing the interpretive process as one that aims for reflective equilibrium).
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familiar objections to coherentism. Through principal reliance on the work
of Rawls, Part II concludes by exploring how coherentists can respond to
what I regard as the most powerful of these objections-namely, that an
account of some practice (such as judicial review) can be coherent but
wrong, at least as measured by some external normative yardstick.
Part III points to, and then elaborates, a further link between Rawls and
Ely: Both advocate a system of government in which the basic political
framework-for Rawls the "basic structure" and for Ely simply the
Constitution-contains largely procedural guarantees that are thinner than
the substantive values individual members of the society hold. As I
elaborate, Ely believes that a well-constructed constitution should be almost
entirely procedural, 17 principally on democratic grounds. Even today's
supermajority, he claims, has no right to enshrine against future legislative
revision those values that we deem fundamental. Although I raise doubts
about whether it is ever truly possible for constitution writers entirely to
avoid giving expression to the substantive values they hold most
fundamental, I conclude that Ely's argument may work better at one
remove. In a book about judicial review, Ely need not persuade us that We
the People lack the authority to enshrine our substantive values in the
Constitution, but if he can make that claim even plausible, then he has gone
a long way toward demonstrating that politically unaccountable judges
interpreting ambiguous texts lack the authority to enshrine their substantive
values in their reading of the Constitution.
I. Is DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION A PRINCIPLE To GUIDE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION?
The core of Democracy and Distrust appears to consist of a two-step
argument: (1) The central value of the Constitution is democratic
participation, and, therefore, (2) in searching for limits on how to interpret
the open-ended provisions of the Constitution, judges should be guided by
the principle of democratic participation. It hardly takes a professional
logician to notice that (2) does not follow inexorably from (1). Even if we
grant that the Constitution is mostly or almost entirely concerned with
establishing the ground rules for self-government in the American republic,
it would still be possible that the few open-ended provisions should be
interpreted more substantively.
But I want to put that objection aside for now, partly because Ely has a
response to it. Sure, he might say, there is no logical inconsistency between
17. See ELY, supra note 1, at 99-101.
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establishing a basically democratic system with substantive side constraints
whose content is to be found by Platonic Guardians, but if over time the
Guardians, pursuant to their ostensibly limited role of enforcing the side
constraints, increasingly remove the most vital questions from the domain
of the voters and their representatives, then the point of the Constitution's
democratic provisions will be lost, and accordingly, we ought to reject at
the outset an interpretation of the open-ended provisions that authorizes the
Guardians to proceed down that path. Even if we assume this response is
persuasive, 18 however, there remains the problem of establishing
proposition (1)-that the Constitution's central value is democratic
participation.
I noted in the Introduction that Ely attempts to establish proposition (1)
in a brief fourteen pages in chapter four. That was an exaggeration. He
actually devotes exactly one sentence to the matter, albeit a longish
sentence punctuated with dashes and a semicolon. He says,
I don't suppose it will surprise anyone to learn that the body of the
original Constitution is devoted almost entirely to structure,
explaining who among the various actors-federal government,
state government; Congress, executive, judiciary-has authority to
do what, and going on to fill in a good bit of detail about how these
persons are to be selected and to conduct their business.19
The rest of the argument in chapter four explains how even most of the
seemingly substantive provisions in the original Constitution and
subsequent amendments can be seen as essentially procedural (and
democratic).2°
Its brevity aside, what should we make of Ely's argument from text and
structure? Not much, I'm afraid. For one thing, the point is a non sequitur.
Ely seems to be saying that because nearly all of the words of the
Constitution are used to set the ground rules for democracy, that's what the
Constitution is fundamentally about. Yet that hardly follows. Suppose that a
constitution went into great detail specifying all the offices of government,
their powers, and so forth and then included, as its final provision, the
following: "The fundamental principle of this government is respect for the
18. I tend to think it is not persuasive, or at least not fully persuasive. In the post-Lochner era,
even the most ambitious programs of judicial review still leave in the hands of elected officials
such decisions as the size and distribution of taxes, whether and when to go to war, and most
questions of macroeconomic policy. For an unelected judiciary to take questions like abortion,
affirmative action, and school prayer off the public agenda thus hardly renders elections pointless.
19. ELY, supra note 1, at 90.
20. See id. at 90-101.
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dignity of all persons, and the High Court shall accordingly void all laws
and other official acts inconsistent with dignity of the person." In the face
of such language, it would be hard to argue that the prolix provisions
establishing the ground rules implicitly set forth an even more fundamental
principle than the express fundamental principle of human dignity. Yet,
given that something like my imaginary "dignity provision" is on offer as
an interpretation of the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, Ely cannot establish the
greater fundamentality of the procedural provisions simply by pointing to
their greater numerosity.
21
Indeed, I am tempted to think that the opposite is true-that to the
extent that the procedural provisions go on at length, they "partake of the
prolixity of a legal code, 22 which, if Chief Justice Marshall is to be
believed, makes them less rather than more fundamental. The notion that
brevity, not prolixity, connotes fundamentality permeates our legal
culture.23 The short, plain statements of principle, like the First Amendment
and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, have the ring of
fundamentality because of, not despite, their brevity.
In any event, even if we count the length and number of procedural
provisions as making out a prima facie case for their importance, it hardly
follows that what they make fundamental is democratic participation. I am
certainly not the first person to notice that the form of representative
government that these provisions establish seems designed to frustrate,
rather than facilitate, the ability of a national majority to enact its will into
law; bicameralism, separation of powers, federalism, and the difficulty of
constitutional amendment are all essentially permanent features of
American government that make the enactment of new national policies in
the United States much more difficult than in parliamentary systems of
government.24 If we want a single master principle to guide constitutional
21. One might also note that the Constitution's Preamble lists, as the document's goals, unity,
justice, domestic tranquility, national security, the general welfare, and liberty but not self-rule.
Even if one takes the Preamble's invocation of"We the People" as tacitly including representative
democracy on the list, it would only count as one of seven aims. For an argument that the
Constitution's primary value is human dignity, see Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of
Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 703, 745 (1980).
22. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
23. Thus, the terse Sherman Act "has long been analogized in its generality and flexibility to
the Constitution." Thomas E. Kauper, The Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
To Study the Antitrust Laws: A Retrospective, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1867, 1871 (2002); see William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1231-37 (2001) (explaining
why the Sherman Act is a "super-statute," or a fundamental norm against which other laws are
measured, and how it came to be understood that way).
24. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 189-216 (photo. reprint 1998) (1913) (arguing that the difficulty of
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005) 1245
HeinOnline -- 114 Yale L.J. 1244 2004-20052
The Yale Law Journal
interpretation, the text and structure of the Constitution point at least as
strongly toward the fragmenting of political power as they do toward its
consolidation in the people's representatives in Washington.
To be sure, in its time, the original United States Constitution
established the world's most democratic system of government for a
national polity, and, over time, American government has become more
democratic in two ways. Provisions like the Seventeenth Amendment
(substituting direct election of senators for state legislative appointment)
have tied the people's representatives closer to the people, while provisions
like the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments have greatly widened the
scope of the franchise. But all of this simply shows that whatever sorts of
questions are committed to decision by popularly elected officials, using
whatever means of making such decisions the Constitution establishes, the
officials have become more accountable to a more broadly defined people.
It is not at all clear that a widespread franchise and direct elections have any
bearing on the question of what issues the people may properly decide.
Thus, democratic participation as an interpretive biber-pinciple cannot
be derived from the Constitution's text and structure standing alone. But
perhaps we should view "the Constitution" as including the interpretive
gloss that has been placed on it over the years. After all, judges and
constitutional lawyers routinely consult constitutional doctrine, evidence of
the original understanding, postenactment history, and ethical and
prudential considerations along with-indeed sometimes before-text and
25structure. At least with respect to original understanding and doctrine, Ely
lawmaking under the Constitution was a deliberate product of fiscally conservative
counterrevolutionary forces at the 1787 Convention); ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 143-46 (2001) (answering, in essence, "not very" to the question
posed by the book's title); WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (n.p. 1885) (preferring parliamentary government to separation of powers
under the Constitution because of the former's greater flexibility). To say that the Constitution's
structural provisions frustrate national policymaking is not to say that they are necessarily
undemocratic. On the contrary, one might think that the original purpose of the structural
provisions was to facilitate and protect representative government at the state level. That view
might then lead one to adopt a strategy of representation reinforcement when state laws are
challenged but not when federal laws are, although a fully specified approach would have to
integrate the substantial changes in the relation between the states and the federal government
effected by the Reconstruction Amendments and the Seventeenth Amendment. For an
illuminating attempt to integrate the Founding and the Reconstruction commitments to state and
national democracy respectively, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
25. For examples of such pluralist or "eclectic" approaches to constitutional interpretation,
see, for example, PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991); and Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 1189 (1987). For a mildly critical assessment, see Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative
and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1788-
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himself seems to adopt this strategy. He reproduces an extended quotation
from Federalist No. 51 to show Madison's commitment to interest group
pluralism; 26 he presents much of the work of the Warren Court as
exemplifying his own representation-reinforcing approach to constitutional
interpretation,27 which he acknowledges was prefigured by Justice Stone's
Carolene Products footnote;28 and he enlists the tail end of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland29 to establish the venerable
roots of a representation-focused constitutionalism.
3
0
But if the point of all of these citations is to establish democratic
participation as the dominant or main theme of American constitutionalism,
the effort is in vain. At least since Calder v. Bull, 31 natural law theories of
constitutional interpretation have vied for supremacy with theories like
Ely's (and others, such as originalism). There are, of course, valid
criticisms of natural law theories, and Ely makes many of them. To say that
an approach or a line of decisions is wrong, however, is not to say that it
does not exist or is marginal. Accordingly, the relevant question is not
whether cases like Roe v. Wade32 are correct, but whether they have a
place-rightly or wrongly-in the constitutional canon. And because the
whole purpose of Democracy and Distrust seems to be to banish such cases
from the canon, it is hard for Ely to deny that they currently have a place
there. Simply put, it makes no sense to argue that representation
reinforcement is a better approach to constitutional interpretation than
fundamental values solely by pointing out that our traditions of
constitutional interpretation give representation reinforcement a large role;
if they also give fundamental values a substantial role, as they do, then
victory for representation reinforcement does not mean defeat for
fundamental values.
Accordingly, Ely probably should not be read to advance the sort of
argument I have been discussing. As I explain in the next Part, the strategy
of Democracy and Distrust is instead best viewed as a kind of coherentism
of the sort practiced by Rawls and Dworkin. Before coming to that
explanation, however, I need to consider three other possible paths by
96 (1997) (arguing that eclectic approaches fail to integrate disparate and seemingly inconsistent
theories of legitimacy).
26. See ELY, supra note 1, at 80.
27. See id. at 105-79.
28. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); ELY, supra note 1, at
75-77.
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
30. ELY, supra note 1, at 85-86.
31. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
32. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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which democratic participation could be thought to be validated as the
master principle of the Constitution.
One possibility is that representative democracy simply is the best form
of government on utilitarian grounds: The greatest preponderance of votes
serves as a rough-and-ready proxy for the greatest good for the greatest
number. How rough and how ready? The philosophical literature of
utilitarianism is haunted by "utility monsters," persons who derive so much
utility from satisfying their own desires--or worse, from inflicting suffering
on others-that a straightforward additive calculus would weight their
preferences more highly than others'. 33 But the principle that each person's
utility counts for equal weight is usually thought to translate neatly enough
into majoritarian democracy in the political realm.34 Exactly why this is so
is unclear. Perhaps the process of gauging and then assigning voting values
to individuals' varying capacities for pain and pleasure is so difficult in
practice that a principle of equality is the only workable one; perhaps the
principle that "'each [should] count for one, and none for more than one' 35
is an axiomatic side constraint to the principle of overall utility
maximization. The details of the argument need not concern us here
because Ely is estopped from invoking a comprehensive moral view like
utilitarianism.
Given the skeptical tone of Democracy and Distrust, some readers may
be surprised to learn that Ely himself approved of democracy on utilitarian
grounds, as he explained at some length in articles written both before and
after Democracy and Distrust.36 The book itself, however, makes only two
passing references to utilitarianism, and then only in the endnotes. 37 Ely
writes there "that the appeal of democracy can best be understood in terms
of its connections with the philosophical tradition of utilitarianism," adding
33. See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, "at Is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 16 (2003).
The utility monster problem nicely connects a standard criticism of utilitarianism with a standard
criticism of pure majoritarian democracy-that each would allow the victimization of minorities.
34. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970) (1780); JAMES MILL,
Government, in ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENT, JURISPRUDENCE, LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, AND LAW
OF NATIONS 3, 5 (photo. reprint 1986) (1825); Thomas Philip Schofield, 'Economy as Applied to
Office' and the Development of Bentham's Democratic Thought, in I HISTORY OF IDEAS
COLLOQUIUM: OCCASIONAL PAPERS 48 (Michael Sutton ed., 1987), reprinted in 1 BENTHAM:
MORAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 407 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2002).
35. JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 14 (1996) (quoting John Smart Mill).
36. See id. at 11-14; John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 405-08 (1978); John Hart Ely, Professor Dworkin's
External/Personal Preference Distinction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 959, 979-81 (defending the connection
between democracy and utilitarianism). For an excellent explanation of Ely's views on
utilitarianism and democracy, see Fleming, supra note 15, at 227-28 & n.76.
37. ELY, supra note 1, at 187 n.14, 237 n.54.
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that "[s]ince nothing in the... analysis [in Democracy and Distrust]
depends on this claim, it is omitted" from the book.38
Ely is correct that his utilitarian basis for prizing representative
democracy is unnecessary to the book's main argument in the sense that a
reader who values democracy on nonutilitarian grounds could nonetheless
find Ely's account of constitutional interpretation appealing. But what of
the reader who comes to Democracy and Distrust without a deep
commitment to democracy, or perhaps with a commitment to democracy
but no special reason to see democratic participation as an overriding
principle of constitutional interpretation? Because the Constitution itself
does not make democratic participation the master principle of
interpretation, this reader will need to look outside the Constitution for that
master principle.
Looking beyond the Constitution, could Ely draw support for a
representation-reinforcing approach to constitutional interpretation from
utilitarianism? He could not, because even if utilitarianism is correct, it is
hardly uncontroversially so. Ely's whole brief against the fundamental
values approach to constitutional interpretation is that fundamental values
are in the eye of the beholder. Complex and controversial philosophies
cannot, he complains, be the basis for judicial review. Ridiculing the idea,
he writes, "We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 6-3. Statute
invalidated., 39 It hardly needs saying that "I like Bentham" is equally
ridiculous. Accordingly, although Ely believed in democracy on utilitarian
grounds, he properly excluded those grounds from Democracy and
Distrust, not so much because they are unnecessary but because they are
inconsistent with the book's basic argument.
I have already adverted to the penultimate reason that Democracy and
Distrust seems to offer for treating democratic participation as the master
principle of constitutional law: In its early pages and repeatedly throughout
the book, Ely asserts that We the People value representative democracy
quite highly and have done so since the Founding. To the extent that these
statements are true, they provide a reason why most readers of Democracy
and Distrust will come to the book predisposed to agree with an argument
that highly values democracy. But if these statements are meant to provide
normative grounds for why an agnostic reader should treat democratic
participation as the central principle of our Constitution, the argument
38. Id. at 187 n.14.
39. Id. at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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appears to be circular.40 It amounts to saying that we should do what the
majority says because the majority believes we should do what the majority
says. Well, we might equally say-in a military dictatorship-that we
should do what the dictator says because the dictator believes we should do
what he says. Of course, widespread belief in a proposition can, under
certain circumstances, count as a reason for belief in the truth of that
proposition, but it cannot noncircularly count as a reason for belief in the
truth of the proposition that widespread belief is a valid criterion of truth.
Finally, one might think that skepticism provides a basis for believing
in democracy. As his belief in utilitarianism indicates, Ely was not a skeptic
in the sense of a person who denied the existence of moral truths. But
Democracy and Distrust might be called epistemically skeptical: Given that
We the People disagree about both the content of moral truth and the best
means for arriving at moral truth, the book seems to say, we may as well
just vote and let the majority decide.
But this argument is no less conclusory than the prior one. Why is
majority vote the default decision procedure? We can stipulate that, ceteris
paribus, it is better for the majority than the minority to rule. But what if
the minority has some special quality that the majority lacks? Why isn't the
default procedure rule by the best educated, or the wisest, or the most
powerful, or the least powerful? There may well be good reasons to prefer
majority rule to any other decision procedure, but our mere inability to
agree on important matters is not, by itself, one of them.
Thus, although most readers bring a strong preference for
representative democracy to Democracy and Distrust, taken at face value
the book does not provide grounds for agnostic or skeptical readers to treat
democratic participation as the master principle of constitutional
interpretation.
II. COHERENTISM IN ELY, DWORKJN, AND RAWLS
All is not lost, however, because most of the grounds I have just
rejected for treating democratic participation as the Constitution's master
principle turn out to support Ely's argument if we understand that argument
somewhat differently from its usual formulation. As I indicated at the
beginning of the prior Part, Ely appears to be making a two-step argument:
(1) a positive claim about the democratic nature of the Constitution and
40. I call this a mere appearance of circularity because, as I explain in the next Part, Ely is
best read as providing a different sort of argument, in which the popular will remains relevant but
not simply on self-referential majoritarian grounds.
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(2) an inference from the positive claim that results in a prescriptive claim
about constitutional interpretation, namely, that the Constitution's open-
ended provisions ought to be interpreted in a way that reinforces democratic
participation. In this Part, I want to suggest a different account of Ely's
project: Democracy and Distrust actually offers a coherentist account-one
that combines descriptive and prescriptive elements, but not in the two-step
fashion that appears on the face of the argument.4 '
A. A Coherentist Reading of Democracy and Distrust
I can best explain what I have in mind by a coherentist account by
reference to interpretation outside of law. Suppose you much prefer
baroque to romantic music; if asked to explain why you like Bach and
Vivaldi better than Brahms and Mahler, you might refer to the almost
mathematical precision of the former, or you might just shrug your
shoulders and say there's no accounting for taste, but in any event, you are
certain of the fact of your preference. Now suppose further that you are
asked to conduct a performance of a Mahler symphony. Notwithstanding
your preference for baroque over romantic music, you might nonetheless
concede that the best interpretation of the music is in the romantic style. In
saying so, you do not deny that it would be possible to perform the
symphony in a different style, perhaps transcribed for a harpsichord; you
might even say that to your own ear the Mahler symphony would sound
better if rescored in the baroque style, or that someone else with very
different tastes might think it would sound best of all if performed as
hip hop. But you acknowledge that the best interpretation of the Mahler
symphony, as a Mahler symphony, is in the original romantic style. To
borrow Dworkin's language, you would say that the romantic style best
"fits" the symphony.
42
Likewise with the Constitution. You might think that the best form of
government is a benevolent dictatorship, but upon reading the
Constitution's text and familiarizing yourself with the cultural
understandings that have grown up around it, you recognize that the
document is best interpreted as the charter for a representative democracy.
In saying so, you do not deny that it would be possible to read the
Constitution as making the President a virtual dictator, at least in certain
41. For an insightful understanding of Ely's work that proceeds in a similar vein, albeit in a
different ultimate direction, see Fleming, supra note 15, at 220-40.
42. This is not much of a stretch. Dworkin develops his account of interpretation for practices
other than law. See DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 46-49, 68-73 (describing interpretation of the
social practice of courtesy).
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spheres,43 or that someone else with very different views about political
theory might prefer to read provisions like the Equal Protection Clause as
guaranteeing a right to minimum welfare." But you acknowledge that the
best interpretation of the Constitution, as a constitution that plays the role in
our society that the actual Constitution plays, is as a charter for a
representative democracy.
If you take this coherentist attitude toward interpretation, then the fact
of popular commitment to democracy can make a difference as to whether
democratic participation should be seen as a master principle to guide
resolution of particular ambiguities. To show why, let me press the music
analogy a bit further.
What do we mean when we say that a romantic performance of a
Mahler symphony best "fits" the symphony? We might mean that this is
what Mahler intended. But this kind of "originalism" in musical
interpretation is highly controversial.45 To be sure, over the last generation,
there has been keen interest in performances on period instruments, but
even the most avid musical originalists do not insist on performance spaces
with poor acoustics or other limitations from the original period. More to
the point, much of what we mean by characterizing a Mahler symphony as
romantic rather than baroque, classical, or hip hop is that the typical
audience for Mahler symphonies expects them to be performed in the
romantic style. Thus when you, my hypothetical baroque music aficionado,
say that even you concede that the romantic style better fits Mahler than
does the baroque style, you do not deny that you would be happier to live in
a world in which most people's expectations had changed, so that people
preferred, and came to expect, Mahler symphonies performed on
harpsichords. Alas, however, you don't live in that world, and so you
concede that in light of our existing social practices, the romantic style in
fact best fits Mahler's music.
43. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States ... ").
44. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9 (1969)
(proposing that "minimum welfare," rather than equality of resources, explains the Warren Court
rulings invalidating state failures to waive fees or provide free services for criminal defendants
and others); Edward B. Foley, Interpretation and Philosophy: Dworkin 's Constitution, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 151, 171-73 (1997) (reviewing DWORKIN, supra note 2) (advocating judicial
recognition of a fundamental right to a living wage and criticizing Dworkin's apparently textualist
reading of the Constitution).
45. For an interesting comparison between such originalism in music and in constitutional
interpretation, see Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1366-67
(1990).
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Again, likewise with the Constitution. You, my hypothetical believer in
benevolent dictatorship, can imagine the day when permanent war has led
Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus indefinitely, when the notion
of a theater of war has been so far expanded by the fact of stateless
terrorists that it applies everywhere, and when the conception of inherent
presidential authority as Commander in Chief has been nearly universally
accepted. In such an imaginary world, it would be quite consistent with
popular understandings of the role the Constitution plays in our society for
the President to be a benevolent dictator, albeit an elected one. But, you
ruefully acknowledge, we don't live in such a world, and so in the actual
here and now, you accept that the Constitution is best interpreted as a
fundamentally democratic charter that limits presidential power.
I contend that Democracy and Distrust is best read as making an
argument of this type. Yes, originalist and fundamental values approaches
to constitutional interpretation cannot be logically ruled out. But to read the
Constitution in these ways would be out of step with both its text-the
musical notes, if you will-and the cultural understandings that surround
the Constitution. So even if you're the kind of person who would rather
downplay the democratic character of the Constitution-akin to the kind of
person who wants to hear Mahler performed on a harpsichord or by a hip-
hop artist-you'll have to acknowledge that your interpretation doesn't fit
with the Constitution as generally known and understood.
How convincing is this argument? If the Constitution and its
surrounding cultural understandings were uncontroversially classifiable as
democratic in the way that Mahler is uncontroversially classifiable as
romantic, then it would be quite persuasive. But, in fact, the Constitution is
more like Beethoven, whose music sits on the borderline of the classical
and romantic styles, sometimes exhibiting the characteristics of each in
different movements of the very same work, as in his Ninth Symphony. As
Ely observes, most of the words of the Constitution deal with structures of
governance, but as Dworkin observes, the best-known parts, like the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, at least provide support for a
fundamental values approach.
Furthermore, the same problem arises at the level of popular
understandings. Yes, Ely is right that the people expect the government to
be democratic in order to be legitimate, but they also expect the courts to
enforce substantive as well as procedural limits on majority rule. Particular
decisions may draw fire, and when they draw sufficient fire popular
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sentiment may for a time turn against the institution of judicial review, 46 but
judicial review to enforce substantive limits on government has been part of
the American system of constitutional government for so long that by now
it almost certainly counts as part of what the people mean by representative
democracy. To borrow Dworkin's somewhat question-begging language,
there is a good case to be made for the proposition that the people hold a
"constitutional" as opposed to a "majoritarian" conception of the concept of
democracy. 47 Or perhaps public attitudes toward the Constitution are simply
a confused jumble, amorphously valuing both "democracy" and "rights"
without a clear conception of either concept, so that a very broad range of
practices could be validated by showing their acceptability to the people.
At this point we may be tempted to say that the debate between Ely and
Dworkin must come to a standstill. Neither can show that his approach-
representation reinforcement versus fundamental values-finds definitive
support in the text, structure, or cultural understandings of the Constitution,
and so the argument ends in a draw. If so, that would appear to be bad news
for Ely, because Democracy and Distrust aims not only to establish the
bona fides of representation reinforcement but, except with respect to a very
small number of clearly substantive constitutional- provisions, to banish
fundamental values as well. Representation reinforcement is offered as the
method by which the Constitution's open-ended provisions should be
interpreted.
Happily, though, Ely can turn to Dworkin's version of coherentism to
resuscitate the argument. For Dworkin, rival interpretations should be
measured along two dimensions: how well they fit the interpreted practice
and how well they justify that practice.48 Ely could grant that a reasonable
case could be made for either a representation-reinforcing approach or a
fundamental values approach on grounds of fit, but could go on to argue
that representation reinforcement does a better job of justifying the practice
46. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 416, 415-18 (1998) (chronicling the
"firestorm of criticism" and loss of public confidence in the Court in the wake of Dred Scott);
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II Reconstruction's
Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (asserting that politics can both "threaten" and "protect"
judicial independence); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Three: The Lesson ofLochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001) ("[I]fthose familiar with the
Court's decisions do not believe those decisions to be socially correct, the work of judges will be
seen as illegitimate.").
47. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 15-19.
48. See DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 90 ("General theories of law... try to show legal
practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it
and the best justification of that practice.").
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of judicial review and that, therefore, as the law "works itself pure, 'A9
fundamental values decisions will and should disappear, replaced by
decisions rooted in representation reinforcement.
And in fact, that is more or less the strategy of Democracy and Distrust.
Following Henry Hart and Albert Sacks and the other constitutional
proceduralists of the generation that preceded him, Ely argues on
institutional competence grounds that the courts ought not be in the
business of discovering fundamental values. 50 Courts are competent to
police the ground rules of democracy, the argument goes, but they should
generally leave substantive policy judgments to elected officials. It is a little
like saying that as between interpreting the music of some transitional
composer-say C.P.E. Bach-in the baroque versus the classical style,5 we
should choose the baroque style if the only instrument we have available is
a harpsichord.
Accordingly, Ely need not establish that democratic participation is the
only plausible master principle with which to make sense of the
Constitution and our constitutional practices. He can acknowledge that
fundamental values provides a plausible rival principle.52 Nor need Ely
demonstrate as a matter of first-order moral philosophy that representative
democracy is the best form of government on utilitarian or other grounds.
He need only show that the principle of representation reinforcement is
better suited for use by judges than a principle of fundamental values and
thus that, all things considered, it provides a better justification for the
practice of judicial review than having judges discover fundamental values
and other alternatives.
That all-things-considered judgment is itself coherentist and not simply
pragmatic, even though it takes account of relative institutional
49. Id. at 400.
50. See ELY, supra note 1, at 88 (contending that representation reinforcement "involves
tasks that courts, as experts on process and (more important) as political outsiders, can sensibly
claim to be better qualified and situated to perform than political officials"); HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1311-13 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(envisioning judges as best suited to making decisions about which other institutions to grant
deference). For Ely's view of Hart and Sacks, see John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory:
Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures,
77 VA. L. REv. 833, 838 (1991) (lamenting that the legal academic left, and then the legal
academic mainstream, cast aside "the legal process school's core methodological assumption" that
courts are different from legislatures).
51. I recognize that this is not a perfect analogy, because the music of C.P.E. Bach could be
classified as neither baroque nor classical but as rococo. Because I am more interested here in
constitutional interpretation than in musical interpretation, I beg the reader's indulgence in the
admittedly unrealistic assumption that performers of the compositions of C.P.E. Bach must choose
between the baroque and classical styles.
52. See ELY, supra note 1, at 43-72.
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competence. Judgments about how a practice best hangs together can be
perspectival. Thus, we could imagine that the best way to make sense of our
constitutional practices as a whole is different for judges and for legislators.
Or, to put the point more tendentiously, scholars like Lawrence Sager, who
contend that the courts appropriately "underenforce" the Constitution
relative to elected officials, 53 deploy a misleading terminology that
privileges the perspective of elected officials. The Court and elected
officials alike can be coherentist, each trying to come up with an
interpretation that best hangs together, but how well a given interpretation
does that job will vary depending on one's institutional perspective.
54
Understanding Democracy and Distrust as coherentist in Dworkin's
sense enables Ely to escape the objection that he has no adequate basis for
selecting democratic participation as his master principle without requiring
him to invoke the sort of controversial moral principles that the overall
thrust of his argument rules out of bounds. That does not mean that Ely's
argument is necessarily persuasive, of course. One might still think, like
Tribe, Dworkin, and others, that the courts are competent to make
principled judgments about substantive values no less than procedural ones;
or one might think-as Justice Frankfurter thought and as some
commentators suggested in the wake of Bush v. Gore55-that institutional
considerations render the Court incompetent to make controversial
judgments with respect to the mechanics of democracy in the same way that
courts are incompetent to make other, nominally more substantive
controversial judgments. 6 These are the mirroring criticisms to which I
53. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
54. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REv. 1105, 1183 (2003) (suggesting that constitutional law is
perspectival in the sense that a single constitutional provision may mean different things to
different institutional actors). I am not claiming that only coherentists can engage in perspectival
or institutional analysis, only that such analysis is consistent with coherentism. Whether Ely
himself would have endorsed perspectivalism, however, seems doubtful. As James Fleming
observes, Ely "basically names as 'the Constitution' those values that are judicially enforceable,
that is, procedural values, rather than arguing for a conception of the Constitution outside the
courts that would include substantive values along with procedural values." Fleming, supra note
15, at 239 n.126.
55. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
56. For Frankfurter's view, see Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality
opinion) (disavowing judicial intervention to redress malapportioned congressional districts as "a
political thicket"). For a small sample of the criticism of Bush v. Gore, see Jeff Polet, The
Imperiousness of Bush v. Gore, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
263, 272-79 (David K. Ryden ed., 2d ed. 2002); and David K. Ryden, The Supreme Court as
Architect of Election Law: Summing Up, Looking Ahead, in THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra, at 304, 306 (evaluating the Court's record in recent election law
cases and stating that the Court manifests "a disturbing proclivity for easy conclusions
unaccompanied by explanation, elaboration, or elucidation" and that "[o]ne need not disagree with
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adverted in the Introduction, and understanding Ely's claims as coherentist
will not simply make them go away. What my coherentist interpretation of
Democracy and Distrust is meant to suggest is that, despite the argument I
put forth in Part I, Ely does offer considerable support for treating
democratic participation as the master principle of constitutional
interpretation.
Furthermore, understanding Ely's argument as coherentist enables his
invocation of Americans' faith in democracy largely to avoid the charge of
circularity. Ely does not rest his coherentist case for representation
reinforcement simply on popular support for democracy. In a coherentist
account, popular understandings of our institutions must be blended in
some way with text, doctrine, and the other matters relevant to
constitutional interpretation. Thus, even if a clear majority of the public
thought that the Constitution were best read as a charter of, let us say,
socialism, 57 that would not by itself make this the best reading of the
document, given its text, history, and the fact that informed opinion
overwhelmingly rejected that reading.
Still, a critic might say, if Ely's argument isn't exactly circular, it is
nonetheless somewhat round: Counting popular understanding in the
calculus, even just a little, loads the dice in favor of representation
reinforcement. This criticism, however, incorrectly assumes that Ely adopts
coherentism at the meta-methodological level in order to ensure that
representation reinforcement falls out at the level of constitutional
interpretation. The relation between meta-methodology-i.e., the method
one uses to select a method of interpretation-and methodology is not
nearly so straightforward as the critic assumes. After all, other accounts of
constitutional interpretation, such as Dworkin's fundamental values
approach, are equally coherentist at the meta-methodological level. Yet
these rival accounts read the popular commitment to representative
democracy as having different entailments at the level of constitutional
interpretation.
Consulting the popular will at the meta-level does not, in other words,
necessarily loop back to the popular will (via representation reinforcement)
at the level of constitutional interpretation. The relation between the
the outcome to be troubled by the Court's failure or refusal to at least acknowledge the larger
issues involved").
57. Cf Columbia Law Sch., Americans' Knowledge of the U.S. Constitution,
http://www2.1aw.columbia.edu/news/surveys/survey constitution/index.shtml (last visited Mar.
21, 2005) (finding, in a random telephone survey of approximately 1000 Americans, that thirty-
five percent answered "yes," thirty-one percent answered "no," and thirty-four percent responded
"don't know" to the question whether the U.S. Constitution contains the statement "[flrom each
according to his ability, to each according to his needs").
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popular understanding at the meta-level and the proper approach to
constitutional interpretation is highly complex and context dependent.
Consider a related phenomenon: There can be nondemocratic regimes that
are or would be validated by consultation of the popular will, as in Nazi
Germany, and, admittedly less commonly, there can be democratic regimes
that are initially validated by reference to the will of an autocrat, as in the
transition from fascism to representative democracy in post-Franco Spain
under King Juan Carlos. Likewise, a coherentism that gives some role to
popular understandings may lead to any number of approaches to
interpretation--originalism, fundamental values, representation
reinforcement, and so forth--depending on what the people think about
how their government should be organized and how those thoughts fit with
other relevant data.
Of course, the choice of a meta-methodology such as coherentism will
affect the approach one takes to interpretation; a choice to count popular
understandings at the meta-methodological level may even make it likely
that democratic participation will figure into the account one ends up giving
at the level of constitutional interpretation. However, if we have good
reasons for thinking that popular understandings should play some role in
our meta-methodological analysis, as coherentists typically think we do,
then that is a sufficient answer to the critic's charge of circularity or
roundness. To be sure, whether we in fact do have good reasons for taking
account of popular understandings at the meta-methodological level is a
legitimate question, and we should address that question directly.
If one sets out to be a meta-methodological coherentist, then it is hard
to imagine how one could avoid counting popular understandings of the
nature of our constitutional regime as among the data that must be made to
cohere. Suppose someone argues today that the Constitution is invalid
because its adoption violated the amendment procedure of the Articles of
Confederation, that the Fourteenth Amendment is invalid because it was
ratified under conditions of coercion, or that the modem administrative
state is invalid because its adoption during the New Deal contravened
fundamental principles. We might try to persuade that person that he or she
is wrong in all three instances because the circumventing of the formal
procedural requirements in each instance satisfied the deeper requirements
58 i olfor constitutional change. But it would also count as a sufficient answer to
these concerns that the Constitution's status as law derives in part from the
fact that the people today accept it as law, and that what they accept
includes the Fourteenth Amendment and the administrative state. Figuring
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out exactly how to weigh such popular views relative to other sorts of data
may be a difficult task for the coherentist, but it is not difficult to show that
they count for something.
To say that meta-methodological coherentism properly takes account of
popular understandings of the Constitution is not to say that one ought to be
a meta-methodological coherentist. One might instead think that the best
way to choose an approach to constitutional interpretation is to ask what
approach is most consistent with first-order axioms about what makes
government legitimate. This would be a purely prescriptive meta-method,
and it could lead, depending on how it was used, to a variety of different
approaches to interpretation. A meta-methodological prescriptivist might
land on originalism, fundamental values, representation reinforcement, or
some other approach at the level of interpretive method, depending on what
went into his or her account of legitimacy at the meta-methodological level.
Or one might be a positivist at the meta-methodological level, but
depending on how one described the constitutional regime one saw, that
could lead to any number of approaches at the level of interpretive method.
To use H.L.A. Hart's terminology, one's "external" descriptive perspective
on our constitutional practices could lead one to conclude that actors, such
as Supreme Court Justices, who are charged with applying the Constitution
adopt fundamental values, originalism, or representation reinforcement at
the level of their own "internal" approach to interpretation.59
I have listed three meta-methodologies: coherentism, prescriptivism,
and positivism. How is one to choose among these? Must we now engage in
a meta-meta-methodological discussion? 60 Won't it just be "turtles all the
way down"? 61 Some pragmatist philosophers might answer these questions
by denying that there can be a purely prescriptive or purely descriptive
account of anything; in rejecting the fact/value distinction, they suggest that
coherentism-combining as it does prescriptive and descriptive elements-
59. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 243 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that "a morally
neutral descriptive jurisprudence [may] record but not.., endorse or share" the incorporation of
moral principles into a particular legal system). As Hart's language indicates, whether judges
should adopt the interpretive method to which meta-methodological positivism points is not the
meta-methodological positivist's concern. Note, however, that a meta-methodological positivist
who also thought, on whatever grounds, that there is a duty to obey the law would have little
difficulty going from meta-methodological "is" to interpretive "ought."
60. If so, Yale Law School would seem to be the place to do so. See Arthur Allen Leff,
Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 n.2 ("'Anything you can do, I
can do meta."' (quoting Leon Lipson's characterization of a certain species of legal writing)).
61. Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 2, 1-2 & n.4 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (attributing a familiar story about infinite regress to William
James, who used rocks rather than turtles in his version).
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is the only way to understand the world and our practices in it. 62 But I have
no need to press that argument here. For my purposes, it suffices to show
that coherentism is a legitimate meta-method that has certain advantages
relative to pure positivism and pure prescriptivism.
Meta-methodological positivism is either not in competition with meta-
methodological coherentism or, if it is, it loses the competition. The
argument for noncompetition stresses the is/ought distinction: Positivists
describe the law as it is; coherentists give an account that has at least some
prescriptive elements. If this picture is accurate, then positivism and
coherentism are simply different enterprises, the former perhaps best suited
to the scholar and the latter to the judge. But if this picture is wrong, it is
because positivism in the sense of a purely descriptive account of the law
(what is sometimes called "hard positivism") is impossible, in which case
coherentism wins by default.63 In either event, the possibility or
impossibility of meta-methodological positivism would not supply a reason
why someone who wants to know how to interpret the Constitution should
reject coherentism.
Next consider purely prescriptive approaches. One might think that
judges should always interpret the Constitution to conform with the original
understanding or that they should always interpret the Constitution so as to
achieve substantive justice, however defined. Although I have distinguished
coherentism from pure prescriptivism, there is nonetheless an important
sense in which coherentism is simply a subset of prescriptivism. The
coherentist says that one cannot implement the original understanding or
achieve substantive justice without asking how these purely prescriptive
principles fit in with the legal regime we have.
For example, suppose that a Supreme Court Justice believes that
originalism provides the correct approach to constitutional interpretation.
This Justice thinks that all decisions departing from the original
understanding are illegitimate and should accordingly be disregarded. What
does she do with cases that are, by her lights, wrongly decided? One
possibility would be to distinguish cases that were decided on other-than-
originalist grounds-which would be disregarded-from cases decided on
originalist grounds but wrongly, by the lights of our hypothetical Justice.
Are decisions in the latter category to be wholly disregarded too? If not,
62. See HILARY PUTNAM, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 63-71 (1987); RICHARD RORTY,
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM: ESSAYS, 1972-1980, at xvii-xxi (1982); RICHARD RORTY,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 363-65, 387-88 (1979).
63. The distinction between hard and soft positivism can be found in HART, supra note 59, at
250-54, and tracks Jules Coleman's distinction between "exclusive" and "inclusive" positivism,
see JULES COLEMAN, Negative and Positive Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 3
(Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1988).
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then our Justice is not a pure originalist; she is more like a coherentist.
64
And if the originalist is really prepared to reconsider every issue de novo,
without any reference to previously decided cases, then she will have a
devil of a time making her prescriptions work in the legal system as we
know it. Accordingly, meta-methodological coherentism can be understood
as the most practical version of meta-methodological prescriptivism.
Of course, there are legitimate objections to meta-methodological
coherentism in constitutional interpretation. I address what I regard as the
two strongest: first, that coherentism is unnecessary and, second, that it is
amoral.
B. Why Can't We Just Muddle Through?
Ely's version of meta-methodological coherentism aims to discover a
master principle or guiding philosophy for constitutional interpretation of
ambiguous texts. When he wrote, the leading candidates were textualism-
originalism and fundamental values. Ely sold his process theory as a third
way that avoided the pitfalls of these polar approaches. But much recent
scholarship rejects the premise of the debate between Ely and his rivals.
Sometimes using the opinions of the Rehnquist Court-and especially its
median member, Justice O'Connor-as their standard, scholars have begun
to question whether we need a master principle or philosophy to guide
constitutional adjudication. Various forms of pragmatism as muddling
through6 5-which I would distinguish from a somewhat different sort of
philosophical pragmatism 66-assert that abstract principles like
fundamental values or representation reinforcement are at best unnecessary
and at worst harmful to judges who must hammer out collective decisions
dealing with the messy problems of real life. Justice Holmes's aphorism
that "[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases" ' 67 pithily sums up
64. This is the reluctant conclusion of Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 772 (1988) ("[T]o accord status to stare
decisis requires an acknowledgement that originalism plays a purely instrumental role by
contributing to the establishment of legitimate government, which in turn promotes stability and
continuity.").
65. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through, " 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79,
80-88 (1959) (defending a method of problem solving that asks incremental questions rather than
measuring various approaches by reference to some ideal solution).
66. Cf Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REv. 593, 595-
96 (1999) (distinguishing between philosophical pragmatism and pure instrumentalism).
67. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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this attitude, which has been lately revived in the work of, among others,
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Richard Posner, and Cass Sunstein.
68
Although there is much good sense in their prescriptions, the muddlers'
fundamental objection is mistaken. The difficulty stems from what Dworkin
calls the phenomenon of "justificatory ascent. ' 69 In our legal culture, courts
cannot simply decide cases by saying something like "plaintiff loses." They
must provide reasons for their decisions, and reasons are typically more
abstract than the decisions they purport to justify.70 For Dworkin, the
requirement that the law exhibit integrity requires that reasons be reconciled
with one another in what becomes a grand synthesis. 71 To be sure, one need
not go so far in the direction of abstraction as Dworkin goes. Courts can, to
use Sunstein's terminology, provide "shallow" or "narrow" reasons for a
decision.72 But they must still have a meta-reason for stopping at the
shallow or narrow reason. Sunstein provides a persuasive one: Sometimes it
will be impossible for a majority of Justices to agree on the rationale for a
decision though they agree on the result, and for reasons of public
acceptability, it is important that the Court speak with one voice. In such
circumstances, it may well be perfectly appropriate for the Court to provide
an "incompletely theorized" account of its decision. 3 But if so, then the
justification for failing to provide a more completely theorized explanation
is itself a theory of interpretation in the same way that Dworkin's principle
of integrity or Ely's principle of representation reinforcement is.
Granted, one will not usually find in the Supreme Court's decisions
themselves a statement to the effect that "we can't agree on a deep principle
so we're providing a shallow one," but then neither will one find much in
68. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 3 (2002) (opposing any single
overarching theoretical framework and advocating a version of pragmatism that looks to multiple
sources of meaning as guided by practical common sense); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59 (2003) (describing legal pragmatism as a form of
consequentialism); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999) (defending the Supreme Court's failure to provide a theoretically
satisfying account of its interpretive practices). Posner comes the closest of these scholars to
developing an argument for judicial pragmatism that links up with the main themes of the leading
pragmatist philosophers: John Dewey, William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 99, 227-65 (1999).
69. Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 357 (1997).
70. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 17-37 (1991).
71. See DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 225-38 (describing the interpretive project of "law as
integrity" and comparing the task of the judge to that of an author attempting to contribute a
chapter to a chain novel).
72. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4,15-21 (1996).
73. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1735 (1995).
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the U.S. Reports espousing other theories. The whole point of a book like
Democracy and Distrust is to provide a justificatory account of what the
Court has really been up to-an interpretation-just as the point of the
muddlers' books is to provide a justificatory account for what they think the
Court has really been up to. Upon inspection, "muddle through" turns out to
be no less a descriptive and prescriptive, and thus meta-methodologically
coherentist, account of judicial review than is "reinforce representation,"
"seek integrity," or "honor the original understanding."
Thus, if the muddlers mean to say that there is no need for a theory or
philosophy of constitutional interpretation, their own arguments for
interpretive muddling belie the claim. If, on the other hand, the muddlers
mean that muddling, as a method of interpretation, is superior to more
single-minded approaches like originalism or representation reinforcement,
then they may have a point.
It should come as no surprise that the work of a Court whose members
join it with different values and experiences will not be readily amenable to
any description that emphasizes a single, overarching methodology. As a
descriptive matter, therefore, the muddlers' account is likely to do a better
job of capturing what actually drives the Justices in any given period than
rivals like originalism, fundamental values, or representation reinforcement.
How does muddling fare on the normative dimension? One might think
that muddling is normatively impoverished relative to other methods of
interpretation because muddling seems to eschew any single normative
framework. Yet once we understand that muddling is in fact a distinctive
approach to constitutional interpretation, we may find that it has much to be
said for it. The best arguments for muddling, like the best arguments for
representation reinforcement, are institutional; the muddler calculates that
in order for the Court to settle major disputes, over the long run it will do
best by saying as little as possible about the likely controversial value
judgments that drive particular decisions.
The muddlers may well have the best approach to constitutional
interpretation. If so, however, that would be because meta-methodological
coherentism points to muddling through as the method of constitutional
interpretation that best fits and justifies our constitutional practices, all
things considered. It would not be because there is no need for something
like meta-methodological coherentism itself. Accordingly, if Ely's
approach to constitutional interpretation loses to muddling through, both
approaches at least get out of the starting gate. The complaint with which
we began our present inquiry-that there is no need for any theory of
constitutional interpretation-fails even on the muddlers' own terms.
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C. The Problem of Bad Coherence
Nonetheless, understanding Ely to be making a coherentist argument
still leaves him open to a second and more troubling general criticism of
coherentism. As explained by Rawls, the measure of a coherentist doctrine
or account of some practice-such as constitutional democracy or political
justice-is
how well the view as a whole meshes with and articulates our more
firm considered convictions, at all levels of generality, after due
examination, once all adjustments and revisions that seem
compelling have been made. A doctrine that meets this criterion is
the doctrine that, so far as we can now ascertain, is the most
reasonable for US.
7 4
In Democracy and Distrust, the relevant "we" is We the American People,
the doctrine is representation reinforcement, and the practice is judicial
review.
The difficulty facing Ely the coherentist is the same as that facing all
coherentists-namely, that a doctrine that is reasonable to us or that meshes
with our firm considered convictions may nonetheless be wrong or unjust.
De jure racial segregation and exclusion of women from most employment
opportunities fit well with the considered convictions of the American
republic circa 1900, but few would defend either practice today. Given the
possibility of "bad coherence, ' 75 coherentism thus seems to be a form of
moral relativism.
I call this a "troubling" objection because most people, including me,
don't like to think of themselves as moral relativists. When we say that
slavery is wrong we think we mean that it is really wrong, not simply that
we don't like it,76 or that we as a society firmly believe today that slavery is
wrong, although people in other times and places thought slavery was
morally acceptable and our own society may come to think the same thing
again in the future.
Some of us might be willing to root our objections to slavery and other
practices we condemn as immoral in religious faith-it is not simply our
74. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 534 (1980). Rawls
sets out his full account of reflective equilibrium in RAWLS, supra note 12, at 48-51.
75. See Radin, supra note 13, at 1705-11.
76. See, e.g., ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1936) (offering a meta-
ethical view in which moral statements convey no meaning and have no truth value); CHARLES L.
STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944) (arguing that moral statements only convey the
speaker's feelings).
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own subjective convictions but God's law that makes slavery immoral.
Some might even go further to say that this sort of argument from authority
is the only way that one can establish moral truth, as opposed to refining
our own fallible and subjective intuitions.77 But even if most religious
traditions now agree about the wrongfulness of slavery, 8 the diversity of
religious beliefs about matters such as abortion, the death penalty,
homosexuality, and the proper role of women in a society like the modem
United States makes religion an inappropriate basis for collective moral
reasoning. Accordingly, Rawls contends that arguments about political
justice must be rooted in a form of "public reason" that holds religious
convictions at arm's length.79
The task of Political Liberalism, Rawls says at the very outset, is to
answer the question, "[H]ow is it possible for there to exist over time a just
and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly
divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" 80 That
might seem like an empirical question. By pointing to various actual liberal
societies that are more or less just and stable, one could show the possibility
of their persistence. But even apart from the fact that no human society
appears ever to have adopted all of the principles Rawls espouses, this is
not the way that he means the question. He means something more like this:
"If it were possible for a just and stable society of free and equal citizens,
who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines, to persist over time, what characteristics would that society
have?" That this is his question is evident from the methodology of both
77. Cf MACINTYRE, supra note 13, at 36-61 (chronicling what the author deems the failure
of the Enlightenment project of wresting moral argumentation from religious justifications).
78. Notwithstanding the important role that religious leaders played in the abolitionist
movement of the nineteenth century and the civil rights movement of the twentieth century, and
whatever the world's leading religions currently say about slavery, the original sacred texts of
Islam and Judaism condone or tolerate some forms of slavery, see, e.g., THE QUR'AN 33:50
("Prophet, We have made lawful for you the wives whose dowries you have paid, and any slaves
God has assigned to you through war. ... ); Leviticus 25:44-46 (permitting the Israelites to
enslave people of other nationalities), and a sacred text of Hinduism implicitly condones the
existence of a caste system, see, e.g., THE EARLY UPANISADS: ANNOTATED TEXT AND
TRANSLATION 237 (Patrick Olivelle trans., 1998) ("People of foul behavior can expect to enter a
foul womb, like that of a dog, a pig, or an outcaste woman."). As for Christianity, the Jesus of the
Gospels does not endorse slavery, but neither does he condemn it, though he lives in a
slaveholding society. See Matthew 10:24 (attributing to Jesus the statement that "[t]he disciple is
not above his master, nor the servant above his lord"). Admittedly, Buddhism does criticize both
slavery specifically and class-based distinctions more generally, see SUTTA-NIPATA 141
("(Therefore) not by birth does one become an outcast, not by birth does one become a Brhmana,
but by deeds one becomes an outcast, by deeds one becomes a Brdhmana." (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)), but Buddhists have never accounted for more than a small
fraction of the American population.
79. See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 224-25.
80. Id. at 4.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005] 1265
HeinOnline -- 114 Yale L.J. 1264 2004-20052
The Yale Law Journal
A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Both begin with a set of
intuitions that, Rawls claims, are widely shared by members of actual
liberal democracies, and then offer coherentist accounts of these intuitions.
The contrast between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism
highlights the coherentist nature of the account of value offered in both.
Rawls explains in the introduction to the latter that the differences between
the two works stem from his realization that "[a] modem democratic
society is characterized . by a pluralism of incompatible yet
reasonable... doctrines" regarding the basic institutional arrangements of
political life.8' The fact of pluralism is, of course, contingent. We might
have found ourselves in a society in which all reasonable citizens accepted
Rawls's notion of justice as fairness; we might have found ourselves in a
society in which nearly all citizens (whether reasonable or not) accepted the
authority of a ruler who claimed legitimacy by divine right or through force
of arms. Although Rawls clearly prefers to live in the sort of society that his
books elaborate, 82 the burden he sets for himself is not to show, as a matter
of first principles, that a politically liberal society is the best sort of society
in which human beings can live. Instead, he simply aims to work out the
institutional entailments of the shared premises of citizens in the sorts of
liberal societies that actually exist.83
And what of Ely? If I am right that, in order for Democracy and
Distrust to succeed, it must be understood as a coherentist account of
democracy and judicial review, then it is no less nor more vulnerable to the
general critique of coherentism than rival interpretations, like those of
Dworkin and Rawls. How vulnerable are such accounts? Very much so and
not at all. Because we ourselves, the members of the polity in question, are
the persons whose convictions about political justice must be made to
81. Id. at xviii.
82. See id. at lxii (contrasting a politically liberal society with one run by "power and
coercion alone," the dominance of which would raise Kant's question "whether it is worthwhile
for human beings to live on the earth").
83. I might soften this assertion in two ways. First, nothing in my argument about how best to
understand Ely turns on whether Rawls's views are really as contingent as I say they are. Readers
who insist on reading Rawls as setting forth universal rather than contingent claims should
consider my discussion of Rawls as merely an illustrative example to set the stage for my
discussion of Ely. These readers should imagine that I have described the works of a hypothetical
philosopher-call him "Shmawls." Second, even those readers who are generally willing to go
along with my account of Rawls might be inclined to add the caveat that Rawls does build into his
account what appears to be an axiomatic rather than an empirical picture of the person. See id. at
18-20. I would point these readers to Rawls's statements suggesting that the conception of the
person must at least be acceptable to, if not strictly derived from, the society whose basic features
Rawls aims to describe, refine, and justify. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 74, at 518 ("In addressing
the public culture of a democratic society, Kantian constructivism hopes to invoke a conception of
the person implicitly affirmed in that culture, or else one that would prove acceptable to citizens
once it was properly presented and explained.").
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cohere in reflective equilibrium, it is practically impossible that we will
conclude that the result is bad coherence. If we did, we wouldn't be in
reflective equilibrium. To be sure, it remains possible that the coherentist
account of value will not satisfy or will even violate some individuals'
religious or comprehensive moral views. But if-with Rawls and Ely-we
rule out religious authority and other comprehensive moral views as
impermissible bases for constructing the basic political institutions of our
society, we see that coherentism provides us with all the normative truth we
can reasonably demand. That doesn't mean that Ely's particular coherentist
account is necessarily best, but it does mean that his account can vie on the
merits with the alternatives.
III. ELY'S IDEAL CONSTITUTION
The previous Part argued that Ely's account of American
constitutionalism-which seems designed specifically to avoid having to
endorse propositions of political philosophy of the sort that Ely attributes to
Rawls-ironically ends up embracing at least implicitly a method of
argument, coherentism, that is closely associated with Rawls. But wait,
there's more. Ely also offers a normative vision that is in one key respect
similar in its content to that offered by Rawls. Both Ely and Rawls argue
that the basic framework of government should contain constitutional
guarantees that are thinner than the substantive values that individual
members of the society hold.
To see the similarity between Ely's vision and that of Rawls, we must
see beyond the differences in the nature of their respective projects. Ely
provides judges with a method for interpreting the U.S. Constitution. Rawls
is not concerned with interpreting any particular constitution and thinks that
the basic structure of a fair and just liberal polity could be guaranteed by a
wide variety of constitutional arrangements.84 But both Ely and Rawls
nonetheless have views about what properly belongs in a constitution, and
their views turn out to be quite similar. Seeing the similarities, as well as
the differences, enables us to see that Democracy and Distrust is more
ambitious than its subtitle-A Theory of Judicial Review-suggests. It
enables us to see that Ely actually sets forth a theory of constitutionalism
writ large and to see, finally, the substantial obstacles that Ely's theory of
constitutionalism must overcome if it is to be persuasive.
84. See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 415-16 (stating that "constitutional design is not a question
to be settled only by a philosophical conception of democracy... in the absence of a case by case
examination" but must instead take "into account the particular political history and the
democratic culture of the society in question").
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What is Ely's account of constitution writing as opposed to constitution
reading? To answer that question, we must begin by acknowledging that
there is no necessary connection between a theory of interpretation for an
existing constitution and a prescriptive theory for constitution writing.
Suppose, for example, that our Constitution contained an Authoritative
Construction Clause that said, "In construing this Constitution, the judges
shall in all matters be guided by the coherentist theory of Ronald Dworkin."
Even if a judge thought Dworkin all wet, she would be obliged to apply his
methods under the Authoritative Construction Clause.85 That same judge,
however, if serving as a delegate to a constitutional convention, would be
free to, and likely would, advocate the elimination or substantial
modification of the Authoritative Construction Clause.
Our actual Constitution, of course, contains no Authoritative
Construction Clause. Even if one is inclined, as I am, to read the Ninth
Amendment as ruling out some methods of constitutional interpretation
with respect to questions of rights, neither that Amendment nor any other
provision authoritatively rules in any method of interpretation. And in
choosing a method of constitutional interpretation, judges and scholars will
be influenced by considerations not unlike those involved in constitution
writing. Those who would be inclined to expressly bar capital punishment
were they writing a constitution will be inclined to read the Eighth
Amendment as implicitly barring capital punishment; those who would be
inclined to give the central government plenary power will be inclined to
give a broad reading to the enumerated powers of Article I and beyond; and
those who would be inclined to give the people's representatives wide
latitude in enacting substantive policy, so long as they do not erect barriers
to everyone's equal participation, will be similarly inclined in reading the
Constitution's open-ended language.
Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that in his brief remarks on what a
constitution ought to contain, Ely espouses proceduralism. 86 Indeed, he
goes so far as to suggest that it is in the very nature of a constitution to
create a procedural framework rather than to resolve substantive issues.
"The American Constitution," Ely states, "has... by and large remained a
constitution properly so called, concerned with constitutive questions.,,8' He
85. To say that a judge would be obliged to follow the Authoritative Construction Clause and
apply Dworkin's theory is not to say that every judge would in fact do so or do so honestly. A
judge who thought Dworkin's theory nonsensical might, for example, treat the Authoritative
Construction Clause as though it were obscured by an ink blot, and thus unenforceable. Cf BORK,
supra note 3, at 166 (proposing such treatment for the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
86. See ELY, supra note 1, at 99-101.
87. Id. at 101.
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then approvingly quotes Hans Linde for the proposition that "'a constitution
must prescribe legitimate processes, not legitimate outcomes.',,
88
That is a remarkable view in light of the fact that, as far as I am aware,
every constitutional democracy that has ever existed-including the United
States and each of its states-has included within its constitution a fair
number of what can only be described as substantive provisions. Linde and
Ely should probably not be read, therefore, as making the semantic point
that most so-called constitutions are "really" something else. Rather, their
point is evaluative. If real constitutions inevitably end up with some
substantive provisions, that is unfortunate. An ideal constitution, they
argue, would be limited entirely to procedural matters.
What reasons can be given for such an austere view? One answer is
institutional competence: If, as Ely contends, judges, as lawyers, are good
at crafting and enforcing rules about fair opportunities but are not especially
qualified to answer other, more substantive questions, 89 then it makes sense
for constitution writers to assign them the former, but not the latter, sort of
task.
The work of Rawls nicely makes the institutional competence point. In
both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, Rawls distinguishes
between the sorts of comprehensive (thick), typically religious or
religiously inspired moral views that people hold about the good, and the
"political" (thin) conception of the good-really a conception of the right
rather than the good-that informs social choices about the "basic
structure" of a liberal democracy over the long haul.90 But even the thin
basic structure is remarkably thick, in the sense that it would seem to
constrain policy choices on a wide range of matters. Thus, the basic
structure must be constructed so as to satisfy the Rawlsian "difference
principle"--which states that inequalities in the distribution of society's
resources are permissible only insofar as they serve to maximize the share
available to society's least fortunate members. 91 I say this feature of
Rawlsian political justice makes the basic structure relatively thick because
it means that matters like tax rates and social welfare spending are not left
to interest group bargaining in the legislature but are in some sense fixed-
88. Id. (quoting Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 254
(197[6])).
89. See id. at 56-60.
90. See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 303-04 (explaining how liberalism can accommodate the
plurality of comprehensive doctrines in modem society); RAWLS, supra note 12, at 395-99
(discussing citizens' "thin" and "thick" conceptions of the good). For critical discussion, see
William Powers, Jr., Constructing Liberal Political Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 443, 447-48 (1993)
(reviewing RAWLS, supra note 14).
91. See RAWLS, supra note 12, at 75-83.
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if not directly by the constitution or by statute then at least by a procedural
mechanism that is itself regarded as part of the basic structure.
Nonetheless, Rawls does not insist that every feature of the basic
structure be enshrined in a judicially enforceable constitutional provision.
In particular, the difference principle, though part of the basic structure, is
not, for Rawls, a "constitutional essential[]. '92 That means that if a liberal
democracy chooses to make its constitution enforceable through judicial
review, it can leave the difference principle to enforcement by some other
mechanism. As Rawls explains,
[W]hether the aims of the principles covering social and economic
inequalities are realized is ... difficult to ascertain. These matters
are nearly always open to wide differences of reasonable opinion;
they rest on complicated inferences and intuitive judgments that
require us to assess complex social and economic information
about topics poorly understood.93
They are accordingly properly left out of a constitution, at least one that is
enforceable through judicial review. 94 For Ely, the enforcement mechanism
of judicial review likewise plays an important role in deciding what should
go into a constitution.
Rawls and Ely are not twins in these matters, however. Rawls does not
think that all substantive values must be kept out of a constitution. For
example, he thinks that a just constitution should include a minimal
guarantee of social welfare, even if the constitution is judicially
enforceable.95
To be sure, this difference between Rawls and Ely could perhaps be
explained by their different assessments of the ease with which judges can
enforce a social minimum. Ely might think that the enforcement of all so-
called positive rights entails the sorts of complex social and economic
assessments that Rawls thinks plague enforcement of distributional but not
minimum social and economic rights. But Ely goes considerably further
still. As a putative constitution writer, he argues against inclusion of any
92. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 228, 228-29 & n.10.
93. Id. at 229.
94. Rawls himself does not include this qualifier, arguing that it would be appropriate to omit
the difference principle even from a constitution that is thoroughly nonjusticiable. Frank
Michelman explains this puzzle by positing that for Rawls, the question whether a principle of
political justice should be included in a constitution is only partly a matter of judges' institutional
competence; it is also partly a matter of the principle's "urgency in relation to liberal legitimacy."
Frank I. Michelman, Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Question of Judicial Review:
A Comment, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1407, 1418 (2004).
95. See RAWLS, supra note 14, at 230.
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substantive rights, negative as well as positive, those that judges could
enforce relatively easily as well as those that judges would have difficulty
enforcing. Accordingly, although Ely invokes judicial competence as an
important reason why, in interpreting our Constitution, courts should opt for
representation reinforcement rather than some other, more substantive
approach,96 institutional competence concerns cannot explain Ely's hostility
to all substantive constitutional guarantees.
The explanation lies, not surprisingly, in Ely's commitment to
representative democracy and his concern about the dead hand problem.
Ely thinks that except on matters of procedure as to which we need clear
rules of fair play, today's majority should not be bound by yesterday's
supermajority, and today's supermajority should not bind tomorrow's
majority. Making the point with respect to Prohibition with characteristic
pith, Ely states that the Eighteenth Amendment was repealed by the
Twenty-First "because such attempts to freeze substantive values do not
belong in a constitution. In 1919 temperance obviously seemed like a
fundamental value; in 1933 it obviously did not."
97
Ely makes a similar and more dramatic point with respect to slavery.
Slavery, he observes, "must be counted [as] a substantive value to which
the original Constitution meant to extend unusual protection from the
ordinary legislative process." 98 Ely thus associates the notion of enshrining
substantive constitutional values with two constitutional failures:
Prohibition and slavery.
Yet, upon reflection, the slavery example would seem to undermine
rather than support Ely's case for keeping substantive values out of the
Constitution. After all, the Thirteenth Amendment does not simply undo the
Constitution's protection for slavery. It affirmatively prohibits slavery. As
Ely notes, "[N]onslavery is one of the few values [the Constitution] singles
out for protection now." 99 But if, as Ely says of Prohibition, attempts to
freeze substantive values do not belong in a constitution, then he must
regard the Thirteenth Amendment as a mistake. Our Reconstruction Era
forebears had no business going beyond saying something like "this
Constitution shall not be construed to protect or prohibit the institution of
slavery."
Interestingly, Ely does not deny (although he also does not
acknowledge) this implication of his argument. In light of Ely's seeming
inability to defend the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, is his
96. See ELY, supra note 1, at 102.
97. Id. at 99.
98. Id. at 93.
99. Id. at 98.
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substance-free approach to constitution writing simply wrong? Or is it the
intuition that the Constitution properly prohibits slavery that is wrong?
One possibility with which Ely flirts would be to defend the Thirteenth
Amendment as fitting the theme of representation reinforcement. Ely states
that "[t]he Thirteenth Amendment can be forced into a 'process' mold" or
justified on equality grounds,'00 but the emphasis here is on "forced."
Presumably, a just society would forbid slavery even if, say, slaves were
permitted to vote and the institution of slavery were not racialized. The
Thirteenth Amendment, most of us surely think, rightly prohibits slavery or
involuntary servitude in satisfaction of a debt, for example. 1' And thus Ely
himself acknowledges the substantive nature of the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition.'°2
So Ely needs an argument for why a generation that can write a clear,
judicially enforceable constitutional prohibition against a practice that is
widely regarded as monstrous should stay its hand. "Because that hand will
someday die and rule from the grave" is not a very persuasive argument if
the current generation is firmly convinced that its position is the correct
one. After all, the whole point of enshrining substantive values in a
constitution is to prevent a future, less enlightened generation from
abandoning those values, perhaps in a time of peril when the people's
leaders claim that they must be sacrificed to preserve other substantive
values, typically security.
Ely in fact credits exactly this argument when it comes to freedom of
expression. Adopting what my colleague Vincent Blasi calls the
"pathological perspective" on the First Amendment, 0 3 Ely argues against
ad hoc balancing approaches to free speech, even forms of balancing that
place a nominally heavy burden on the government censors. "[A] specific
harm test of any sort," he writes, "is likely to erode in times of perceived
100. Id.
101. To be sure, that result does not inexorably follow from the text of the Thirteenth
Amendment, which exempts from its prohibition "slavery [or] involuntary servitude.., as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." Suppose that a state or
the federal government were to criminalize the nonpayment of debts. Could it not then impose
slavery or involuntary servitude as punishment for persons duly convicted of the crime of failure
to pay a debt? Almost certainly not, although that result would best be explained by reference to
the principle that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" bars
punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the offense, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
311 (2002) ('" [lit is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense."' (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910))
(second alteration in original)).
102. See ELY, supra note 1, at 98.
103. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 453 (1985).
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crisis." 10 4  In this account, the categorical approach to the First
Amendment-indeed, the First Amendment itself-serves as a kind of
Ulysses contract: In calm times, the people bind themselves to the mast of
robust protection for free expression, calculating that in subsequent times of
crisis they will be tempted by the siren song of alarmists urging measures to
suppress speech that they would eventually come to regret when the crisis
passed. 0 5 The argument is a good one, but it is hard to see that the
phenomenon just described is confined to matters of free speech.
Constitutional democracies appear to go through periodic paroxysms during
which they temporarily lose faith in their fundamental values. During these
periods, the people are prone to xenophobia, to suppression of dissident
speech, and more generally to exaggerating the degree to which
maintaining order requires the sacrifice of liberty.
10 6
Ah yes, Ely would say, but these paroxysms have tended to fit the
Carolene Products pattern: Germans, Japanese, Communists, and Muslims
are targeted in the relevant periods; the rights sacrificed are procedural in
that they involve either free expression or the due process protections of the
criminal courts. A constitution that enshrines only procedural values of the
representation-reinforcing sort will thus suffice to meet these challenges.
We don't need general substantive constitutional protections. 1°7
Maybe we don't, I'm tempted to reply, but where's the harm? Why not
prohibit slavery against the off chance that in a less enlightened future age
someone tries to enslave our debtor grandchildren? Or, if you think that
example preposterous-as easily dismissed as Harry Wellington's
104. ELY, supra note 1, at 115.
105. I largely put to one side the fact that constitutions are usually written in times of
tumult-such as in the wake of a revolution-rather than in calm times. Perhaps it is only in or
immediately after a crisis that the people (of any nation) focus attention on their fundamental
commitments rather than the concerns of daily life. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991) (distinguishing between "constitutional moments" of engaged citizenship
and periods of "ordinary politics"). Suffice it to say that whatever the tenor of the times,
constitution writers-if their work is to be regarded as ultimately successful-will view
themselves as writing for the ages, even as they compromise some first principles to accomplish
relatively short-term political aims.
106. For examples memorialized in the U.S. Reports (or soon to be), see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (rejecting the government's claim that the courts must grant complete
deference to a presidential assertion that a U.S. citizen is an unlawful enemy combatant and
therefore subject to indefinite detention); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding Executive Order No. 9066 excluding persons of Japanese descent from a described
portion of the Western United States); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a
World War I-era prohibition on the teaching of languages other than English); and Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (sustaining a conviction under the Espionage Act of June 15,
1917 for the mailing of a pamphlet urging readers to resist conscription through lawful means).
107. Cf ELY, supra note 1, at 181-82 (arguing that a representation-reinforcing approach to
constitutionalism would prohibit a genocidal regime, which could only come to power in a
democracy by victimizing a discrete and insular minority).
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hypothetical law forbidding the removal of gall bladders108-how about a
constitutional amendment categorically prohibiting the torture of any
person, even if ostensibly authorized by the President and undertaken for
the purpose of obtaining information needed to avert grave harm to, or the
death of, innocents? There may be reasons to think such a substantive
prohibition unwise,109 but, in light of recent revelations, the claim that it is
useless cannot be seriously maintained." 0
I think Ely's answer to this example would have to be that the people
oughtn't write their most cherished substantive values into the Constitution
because more often than not they will end up enshrining values that they
will later come to reject-not just in times of crisis but in their considered
sober judgment. For every prohibition of slavery, the people will enact a
prohibition on alcohol or a Contracts Clause, which will then have to be
either repealed or construed out of existence."' You may think with utter
confidence that the value you hold-the immorality of abortion, say, or the
immorality of substantial government restrictions on abortion in the early
stages of pregnancy-ought to be permanently enshrined against
backsliding, but when you reflect on the fact that earlier generations
thought the same way not only about values you don't now hold but also
about ones you find positively repugnant (such as slavery), you will hesitate
to enshrine your chosen value in a constitution.
Whether it is practical to expect people to entertain this sort of doubt
about their most deeply held values is itself doubtful. As Holmes was fond
of saying, what it means to hold a value, or more generally, a belief of any
108. See id. at 182-83.
109. For example, some people think nonlethal torture should be permitted when it is
calculated to ascertain where a captive terrorist has planted a ticking bomb. See, e.g., ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE
CHALLENGE 131-63 (2002). For criticism of this view, see David Cole, The Priority of Morality:
The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1794-95 (2004).
110. For an indication of the extent to which torture is considered a valid (and perhaps
valuable) tool in U.S. antiterrorism policy, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 31-39 (Aug. 1, 2002), available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrfogationmemo20028Ol .pdf
(stating that a federal statute imposing criminal penalties for acts of torture committed by persons
acting under color of law is unconstitutional to the extent that it interferes with the President's
power as Commander in Chief to direct interrogations of enemy combatants in wartime); see also
id. at 3-4 (finding in that same statute a specific intent requirement that can immunize
interrogators from prosecution, even if they "know" that severe pain will result from their
actions). But see Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to James B.
Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
dagmemo.pdf (superseding and largely repudiating the August 2002 memorandum).
111. See ELY, supra note 1, at 99-100. As Rawls observes in a related context, this sort of
claim "hinges on fundamental questions about how political institutions actually work and rests on
otr rough knowledge of these things." RAWLS, supra note 14, at 424.
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sort, deeply is that one "'can't help' but believe in it. 112 And if you can't
help but believe some substantive normative proposition-that slavery or
torture is always wrong, say-you probably also can't help but believe that
a future generation that comes to disbelieve this proposition will simply be
mistaken; you will see that potential departure as a fall from grace rather
than as progress. If someone tells you that, over the long run, the values the
people have tended to enshrine in the Constitution are ones that you now
regard as misguided or immoral, you will take this cautionary tale as a
reason to be very sure that you only work to enshrine in the Constitution
your most deeply cherished values--only those values that you really can't
help but believe. But that just means that you may try to entrench fewer
substantive values than you would have tried to entrench otherwise; the
caution is unlikely to lead you to follow Ely's austere advice that you
entrench no substantive values in the Constitution.
And that's probably just fine with Ely. In saying that an ideal
constitution would be wholly procedural, Ely is not saying that we should
cast aside the Constitution we have as impure. He thinks our actual
Constitution, which by his own reckoning includes at least a handful of
bona fide substantive provisions, is nonetheless a basically procedural
document. Ely's point about constitution writing is probably best
understood as rhetorical. If he can make plausible the claim that even the
people in their capacity as constitution writers, armed with the full
legitimacy of a supermajoritarian mandate, ought not entrench what they
firmly regard as fundamental substantive values, then the much weaker
claim that unelected judges, armed only with ambiguous text adopted in
different circumstances, ought not interpret that text to entrench what a bare
majority of them regard as substantive values should seem like a no-brainer.
CONCLUSION
Judicial review, to be legitimate in a constitutional system that highly
values rule by the people, must be sufficiently cabined to allow decisions of
democratically accountable bodies to play the leading role in the day-to-day
business of government. In principle, one could look to text, original
understanding, or some other set of materials for limiting principles, but
Ely's principle of representation reinforcement more directly ties the
solution to the problem. If our aim is to limit judicial review so that we
preserve democracy, what could be better than a principle that says that
112. SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
283 (1989) (quoting a letter from Holmes to John Gray).
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judicial review should be limited to those circumstances in which it
preserves democracy?
But should we aim to limit judicial review so as to maximize
opportunities for democratic participation? Perhaps because Ely's readers
already highly value democracy, it is easy to miss the fact that Democracy
and Distrust does not provide a persuasive justification for that starting
point. Nonetheless, if we see Ely's project as coherentist in the same way
that other accounts of American constitutionalism are coherentist, then the
value that the American people place on representative democracy can
combine with its role in the constitutional text and the institutional
limitations of the judiciary to make the case for a representation-reinforcing
approach to constitutional interpretation.
Whether Ely's case is persuasive depends in part on the extent to which
we share his view that constitutions ought to enshrine few if any substantive
values. Like Ely, Rawls holds that the foundational principles of a liberal
democracy are appropriately thinner than its full substantive commitments,
but Rawls includes within his constitutional essentials "a fully adequate
scheme of basic liberties"'"13 that is not procedural in Ely's sense."14 We do
well to recall, however, that Rawls is not primarily concerned with the
institutional mechanisms by which liberal democracies operationalize their
foundational commitments. The principal focus of Democracy and Distrust,
by contrast, is institutional. Ely may have strong views about what belongs
in a constitution, but his burden of persuasion is only to establish the limits
on the power of judges to find their values in the Constitution we have.
The persuasiveness of Ely's argument also depends on the answers he
can give to two criticisms that I have not directly addressed in this article.
First, Ely's picture of American law as the product of legislative
deliberation is open to doubt in an age when administrative agencies subject
only to presidential supervision, if that, play a very large lawmaking role.
Ely anticipates and responds to this criticism by calling for a revival of the
nondelegation doctrine,1 5 but he may underestimate the degree to which
even a nominally forgiving test such as the "intelligible principle"
requirement could, if taken seriously by the courts, be used to throw sand in
the gears of the administrative state. Ely reassures us "that the
nondelegation doctrine, even at its high point, never insisted either on more
113. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 334.
114. See id. at 335 (including within the basic liberties "the liberty and integrity of the person
(violated, for example, by slavery and serfdom, and by the denial of freedom of movement and
occupation)"). For an ambitious effort to translate Rawls's liberties into constitutional doctrine,
see JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (forthcoming 2006).
115. See ELY, supra note 1, at 132-34.
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detail than was feasible or that matters be settled with more permanence
than the subject matter would allow."'" 6 One is left to wonder, though,
whether the modem (near) death of the nondelegation doctrine might be
due to the Justices' recognition that they are poorly situated to say how
much detail is feasible or how much permanence a given subject matter
allows. Perhaps the best that can be said for Ely's view of these matters is
that the problem of delegation is irrelevant to judicial review of legislation,
which, after all, is the primary focus of Democracy and Distrust.
That still leaves Ely vulnerable to a second, quite serious criticism,
which applies to the whole of his theory. The core problem for Ely has
always been the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between which
constitutional rules of law can and cannot be defended as representation
reinforcing. Our most socially divisive constitutional issues-including
abortion, affirmative action, the separation of church and state, free speech
rights involving the flag, gay rights, and racial profiling of suspected
terrorists-all involve either the sorts of constitutional provisions that
expressly qualify for special judicial solicitude under the Carolene
Products framework or, as in the case of abortion, that can be plausibly re-
rationalized in terms of such provisions." 7 Ely is left in the uncomfortable
position of either allowing that a representation-reinforcing theory of
judicial review excludes nothing and is thus indistinguishable from a
fundamental values approach, or of having to declare by seeming fiat that
some rights that can plausibly be rooted in equality or democratic
participation are really about liberty and thus impermissibly substantive.
Although there is much to the foregoing criticism, at the end of the day
it is hardly devastating. In a post-legal-realist world, any conceptual
distinction can be deconstructed. The test of a coherentist account of some
practice is not whether each of the terms it deploys can be defined with
absolute rigor but whether the account makes sense as a whole. A
coherentist account succeeds when insights at the wholesale and retail
levels mutually reinforce one another.
Accordingly, we should define the scope of representation
reinforcement in Ely's work by how he uses the concept in his discussion of
116. Id. at 133.
117. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199-
207 (1992) (arguing that the abortion right should have been rooted in the Equal Protection
Clause). Ely himself did not originally think that the abortion right could be successfully rooted in
equality, see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973), but by 1996 he conceded that "Roe ha[d] contributed greatly to the ... general
move toward equality for women, which seems to me not only good but also in line with the
central themes of our Constitution," ELY, supra note 35, at 305. As early as 1987, he expressed
the view that, while Roe was a mistaken decision, it ought not be overruled. See id. at 304.
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concrete constitutional problems like abortion, affirmative action,
protection for dissident speech, and malapportionment. I cannot speak for
other readers, but for me at least, even when I disagree with one of Ely's
conclusions on these and other issues, I find his case analysis and his
theoretical framework mutually illuminating. Even without a clear
distinction between substance and procedure, Ely's retail-level analysis
demonstrates the utility of his theory, while his theory provides the glue
that makes his analysis hang together.
Ely's theory bears on today's retail-level problems no less than those
that seemed most pressing in his day. Although the terrain of contestation in
the Supreme Court has shifted somewhat from the question of when and
how courts ought to recognize individual rights claims to the question of
when and how Congress may, in an effort to protect individual rights of its
own devising, override claims of states' rights, the underlying issue remains
the same: What justifies the Court in insisting on its solutions given its
peculiar institutional role and the ambiguity of the relevant constitutional
text? 1 8 In an era when the opinions of the Warren Court, whose work
Democracy and Distrust aims to justify, so often now read like period
pieces, 19 the book itself remains fresh, even urgent.
118. The issue is posed most cleanly in the Court's recent decisions by Justice Breyer's
dissent in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). There the majority held that
Congress overstepped its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in creating a
private right of action against state entities to enforce a right against disability discrimination in
employment given that such discrimination, under the Court's own prior precedents, was only
subject to rational basis review. Id. at 365-74. For Breyer and the three Justices who joined him,
this approach stood the rational basis test-designed to give deference to elected bodies, not to
subject their decisions to exacting scrutiny--on its head. Id. at 382-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. I have in mind especially the cases finding that the state's failure to provide free counsel
or to waive fees for indigent criminal defendants amounts to discrimination against the poor. See,
e.g., Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (per curiam) (stating, in the course of finding a
right of an indigent defendant to a free transcript of a preliminary hearing, that "[o]ur decisions for
more than a decade now have made clear that differences in access to the instruments needed to
vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant to
the Constitution"); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (finding that state failure to
provide free counsel for direct criminal appeal works invidious discrimination against the poor).
Such decisions from a largely bygone age made plausible, in 1969, Michelman's claim that the
Court had found in the Constitution a state "duty to protect against certain hazards which are
endemic in an unequal society." Michelman, supra note 44, at 9 (emphasis omitted); see also id.
at 14-16 (finding Rawls's thoughts on distributive justice and minimum welfare central to a
proper understanding of the relevant Warren Court decisions).
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